PSI’s Electoral Gambit: Will It Pay Dividends?

The Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI, Indonesia’s Solidarity Party) has captured the nation’s attention with its maneuver electing Kaesang Pangarep, the youngest son of president Joko Widodo or Jokowi, as its party leader. Kaesang’s appointment is nothing short of phenomenal, considering that he has only been a party member for less than a week and has no prior history of involvement with the party.

More importantly, it also marks a significant step in the party’s ongoing effort to demonstrate its unwavering loyalty to President Joko Widodo. Previously, PSI has introduced the concept of “Jokowisme”, which posits that Jokowi’s style of governing constitutes a coherent philosophy. The party has also declared its commitment to heed any directives from the executive branch.

 

What accounts for PSI’s abrupt change in direction, transitioning from a party predominantly driven by a progressive, liberal democratic agenda to one tethering its destiny to a political figure recently associated with Indonesia’s democratic setbacks? What factors are at play in their strategic calculus, and what could lie ahead for PSI in the future?

The Electoral Dilemma

 

PSI abrupt change in direction is perplexing given the potential negative repercussions they carry. For one, the country’s executive branch has faced criticism for contributing to Indonesia’s democratic setback with its several undemocratic policy positions. Secondly, the president has also left the impression that he may lean towards supporting Prabowo Subianto, his defense minister with a history of human rights allegations, in the upcoming presidential election. Considering PSI’s progressive reputation, it appears imprudent to align itself with these two political figures.

 

Indeed, PSI has consequently suffered criticism from various quarters including internally from party cadres. Among the criticisms levelled against the party are allegations of supporting political dynasty and backing a presidential contender with a problematic political history. These criticisms could potentially undermine PSI’s already limited voter base. Signs of these erosion have become evident with the resignation of several influential party cadres such as Guntur Romli. 

 

Upon closer inspection, however, all these perplexing political maneuvers may actually constitute a calculated electoral gambit to respond to a certain electoral dilemma. PSI sacrifices some up front while hoping for considerable future gain. 

 

To begin with, understanding PSI’s electoral strategy necessitates recognizing the party’s unfortunate predicaments, its current challenge, as well as the electoral dilemma the party is grappling with. Like other small, newly-formed parties, PSI faces what seems like unsurmountable challenge: the requirement to pass the 4% electoral threshold in order to secure seats for their legislative candidates in the national parliament. For the record, in the previous 2019 legislative election, PSI only managed to garner a negligible 1.89% or approximately 2.6 million of the national votes.

 

PSI’s poor performance stems from two unfortunate predicaments, structural and non-structural in nature. First, the party lacks a charismatic figure that could attract voters in a populist fashion, namely through direct connection between the elites and the masses. Secondly, PSI’s ideological agenda, centered around the principles of liberal democracy, finds itself resting on an exceedingly narrow support base within Indonesia. Liberal democrats have always been a minuscule minority in Indonesian politics.

 

In formulating a strategy to cope with this challenge, PSI encounters a dilemma revolving around choosing two equally unfavorable alternatives. First, PSI could make efforts to expand beyond their initial electoral base, the predominantly urban liberal democrats, to attract new supporters presumably from Jokowi’s voters. Pursuing this course, however, might entail compromising their ideological agenda and might result in losing the former without necessarily gaining many of the latter. 

 

The second alternative involves sticking to their liberal democratic platform while hoping for more favorable outcome in the 2024 election. This stance does not appear promising as repeated survey results consistently indicate that supports for PSI remains below the 2% mark. 

 

As immediate changes to the demographic and ideological composition of the country are beyond reach, PSI consequently has focused on remedying their first predicament: identifying a charismatic figure to tie their electoral prospects with. A figure like Joko Widodo is an ideal candidate due to the populist appeal that the president’s hold over the masses. To date, Jokowi’s approval rating is consistently above 75%. 

 

PSI is thus banking on the possibility of benefitting from a coattail effect, if any, by endorsing the president and creating a virtually interchangeable image between the party and the president. 

 

 

Will the Electoral Gambit Yield Dividend? 

 

PSI is not the first party with similar electoral problems of narrow voter base and the need to reach out beyond its initial ideological corner. The history of electoral socialism in the early 20th century Europe provides us with a pertinent lesson that social democratic parties increased their vote shares once they abandoned their revolutionary ideals and reached out beyond its working-class base. 

 

PSI’s move to the center, namely following suit other parties in Indonesian political arena that promote political figure instead of programs, thus appears promising. One could say that PSI is maturing to become a political realist. The party relinquishes its transformative agenda, and fully embraces the pragmatic nature of Indonesian politics. 

 

As a consequence of this strategic pivot, the party will receive more exposure beyond its initial urban, highly educated, secular-nationalist niche. It will broaden its appeal to encompass those voters who identify themselves with Joko Widodo and his family on a national scale. It is plausible that PSI will be better known as a Kaesang’s party instead of a party driven by a transformative mission.

 

In the long run, however, PSI will also be indistinguishable from other parties which relies on charismatic figures. More importantly, its fate will be tied with the currency of Joko Widodo’s reputation. This reliance to Jokowi’s standing creates a possibility where PSI’s votes could experience a gradual decline in the future. 

 

Personal popularity, much like any other political commodity, comes with an expiration date. The example of president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who was once highly popular, serves as a reminder that even the most esteemed figures can witness a decline in their popularity over time. His Democratic Party, once at the pinnacle of political influence, has gradually descended to a more modest position in Indonesia’s political landscape. 

PSI ought to be mindful, recognizing that their short-term tactical maneuver may run counter to their long-term strategic objective: namely to establish a stable presence in Indonesia's political arena.

The Jakarta Post, 2023/10/14

Not So Common, Apparently

As has been a tradition in understanding politicians and their political behavior in Indonesia, one typically scrutinizes their formative period as a person: where they were born, grew up, and finally maturing as a politicians. This biographical approach has a long pedigree; see one writing about general Soeharto here, and even one writing about our current president Joko Widodo here. 

A trope in this approach is how the politician comes from humble background and thus explains their (alleged) quest to elevate the fate of the marginalized: economically, socially, politically. "I am part of the 'rakyat' or commoners." That is more or less the message the politicians broadcast. Whether that is genuinely the case, or a mere fronting, is for you to judge yourself (should you have the privilege to know the politicians in person).

I myself am curious to see where Jokowi used to hang out, especially where his favorite culinary joints are. Information from the internet tells us that during his days in Solo one of his favorite places is soto Triwindu, a meat or chicken soup named after the traditional market where the food stall located.

 

 I consider myself a big fan of soto, not yet a knowledgable afficionado but already a sucker for soto session anytime anywhere, and can confirm that soto Triwindu is indeed delicious, off the chart for that type of soto. But also, here is an important information, a rather fancy soto place. At least to my initial impression.

If soto is commoners' food, then soto Triwindu is among the royals. Certainly not the kind of kaki lima place I go every morning. Soto Triwindu sets itself aside from others not because it is being overtly expensive. It is still affordable to Jakarta middle class' purchasing power. Rather, it is special owing to its presentation. It is more a restaurant than a street food stall. The fried tempehs, beef tripe (babat), and other side dishes to compliment the soto are put inside a glass drawer of a rather fancy piece of furniture, to mention one of its unique presentation.

Now, lets assume this is indeed Jokowi's favorite soto place and there is an extent to which it describes what kind of person he is. Is he a commoners like us? Yes and no. Our president indeed is a commoner. Much more so seen from the capital of Jakarta where the middle class frequent fancy ethnic restaurants and Western food franchises. But among the commoners, Jokowi occupies a place in its upper echelon. He appears cultured, has a taste, and more importantly could afford his taste. People tend to forget that when he commenced his journey in electoral politics, he has already been a self-made man (subnational scale nothwitstanding) namely a successful furniture businessman exporting his products worldwide.

How Illiberal Is Indonesia's Democracy?

 My latest paper provides a rudimentary measure of the degree of Indonesia's illiberal democracy by looking at the involvement of the state in enforcing religious values. Comparison between Indonesia's religious legislation with other democracies yields an observation that Indonesia is rather unusually illiberal: the state is heavily involved in religion enforcement. The paper is available here, and the data replication material here.

Snippets from the paper. The boxplot below demonstrates that democracies have narrower spread of scores in terms of the number of religious legislation. Autocracies, in contrast, has wider spread reflecting a population of countries with high scores.

With that difference in mind, it is interesting to see whether there are outlier cases. For example, democracies that pass high number of religious legislation. Another figure below maps countries on two important planes: their democratic scores (V-Dem dataset) and their religious legislation scores (RAS 3 dataset). Indeed, some countries demonstrate deviation from the typical relationship between regime type and religious legislation.  Democracies usually have low religious legislation scores, with important exceptions including Indonesia.

More discussion in the paper in regard to what high enforcement of religion implies to the quality of Indonesia's democracy. Especially, to the degree of its illiberal nature.