The Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI, Indonesia’s Solidarity Party) has captured the nation’s attention with its maneuver electing Kaesang Pangarep, the youngest son of president Joko Widodo or Jokowi, as its party leader. Kaesang’s appointment is nothing short of phenomenal, considering that he has only been a party member for less than a week and has no prior history of involvement with the party.
More importantly, it also marks a significant step in the party’s ongoing effort to demonstrate its unwavering loyalty to President Joko Widodo. Previously, PSI has introduced the concept of “Jokowisme”, which posits that Jokowi’s style of governing constitutes a coherent philosophy. The party has also declared its commitment to heed any directives from the executive branch.
What accounts for PSI’s abrupt change in direction, transitioning from a party predominantly driven by a progressive, liberal democratic agenda to one tethering its destiny to a political figure recently associated with Indonesia’s democratic setbacks? What factors are at play in their strategic calculus, and what could lie ahead for PSI in the future?
The Electoral Dilemma
PSI abrupt change in direction is perplexing given the potential negative repercussions they carry. For one, the country’s executive branch has faced criticism for contributing to Indonesia’s democratic setback with its several undemocratic policy positions. Secondly, the president has also left the impression that he may lean towards supporting Prabowo Subianto, his defense minister with a history of human rights allegations, in the upcoming presidential election. Considering PSI’s progressive reputation, it appears imprudent to align itself with these two political figures.
Indeed, PSI has consequently suffered criticism from various quarters including internally from party cadres. Among the criticisms levelled against the party are allegations of supporting political dynasty and backing a presidential contender with a problematic political history. These criticisms could potentially undermine PSI’s already limited voter base. Signs of these erosion have become evident with the resignation of several influential party cadres such as Guntur Romli.
Upon closer inspection, however, all these perplexing political maneuvers may actually constitute a calculated electoral gambit to respond to a certain electoral dilemma. PSI sacrifices some up front while hoping for considerable future gain.
To begin with, understanding PSI’s electoral strategy necessitates recognizing the party’s unfortunate predicaments, its current challenge, as well as the electoral dilemma the party is grappling with. Like other small, newly-formed parties, PSI faces what seems like unsurmountable challenge: the requirement to pass the 4% electoral threshold in order to secure seats for their legislative candidates in the national parliament. For the record, in the previous 2019 legislative election, PSI only managed to garner a negligible 1.89% or approximately 2.6 million of the national votes.
PSI’s poor performance stems from two unfortunate predicaments, structural and non-structural in nature. First, the party lacks a charismatic figure that could attract voters in a populist fashion, namely through direct connection between the elites and the masses. Secondly, PSI’s ideological agenda, centered around the principles of liberal democracy, finds itself resting on an exceedingly narrow support base within Indonesia. Liberal democrats have always been a minuscule minority in Indonesian politics.
In formulating a strategy to cope with this challenge, PSI encounters a dilemma revolving around choosing two equally unfavorable alternatives. First, PSI could make efforts to expand beyond their initial electoral base, the predominantly urban liberal democrats, to attract new supporters presumably from Jokowi’s voters. Pursuing this course, however, might entail compromising their ideological agenda and might result in losing the former without necessarily gaining many of the latter.
The second alternative involves sticking to their liberal democratic platform while hoping for more favorable outcome in the 2024 election. This stance does not appear promising as repeated survey results consistently indicate that supports for PSI remains below the 2% mark.
As immediate changes to the demographic and ideological composition of the country are beyond reach, PSI consequently has focused on remedying their first predicament: identifying a charismatic figure to tie their electoral prospects with. A figure like Joko Widodo is an ideal candidate due to the populist appeal that the president’s hold over the masses. To date, Jokowi’s approval rating is consistently above 75%.
PSI is thus banking on the possibility of benefitting from a coattail effect, if any, by endorsing the president and creating a virtually interchangeable image between the party and the president.
Will the Electoral Gambit Yield Dividend?
PSI is not the first party with similar electoral problems of narrow voter base and the need to reach out beyond its initial ideological corner. The history of electoral socialism in the early 20th century Europe provides us with a pertinent lesson that social democratic parties increased their vote shares once they abandoned their revolutionary ideals and reached out beyond its working-class base.
PSI’s move to the center, namely following suit other parties in Indonesian political arena that promote political figure instead of programs, thus appears promising. One could say that PSI is maturing to become a political realist. The party relinquishes its transformative agenda, and fully embraces the pragmatic nature of Indonesian politics.
As a consequence of this strategic pivot, the party will receive more exposure beyond its initial urban, highly educated, secular-nationalist niche. It will broaden its appeal to encompass those voters who identify themselves with Joko Widodo and his family on a national scale. It is plausible that PSI will be better known as a Kaesang’s party instead of a party driven by a transformative mission.
In the long run, however, PSI will also be indistinguishable from other parties which relies on charismatic figures. More importantly, its fate will be tied with the currency of Joko Widodo’s reputation. This reliance to Jokowi’s standing creates a possibility where PSI’s votes could experience a gradual decline in the future.
Personal popularity, much like any other political commodity, comes with an expiration date. The example of president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who was once highly popular, serves as a reminder that even the most esteemed figures can witness a decline in their popularity over time. His Democratic Party, once at the pinnacle of political influence, has gradually descended to a more modest position in Indonesia’s political landscape.
PSI ought to be mindful, recognizing that their short-term tactical maneuver may run counter to their long-term strategic objective: namely to establish a stable presence in Indonesia's political arena.
The Jakarta Post, 2023/10/14