When Washington Scoffs, Jakarta Leads

 President Prabowo Subianto's recent address at the United Nations touched on a range of issues, but among other things it carried an important pledge: Indonesia’s commitment to achieving net-zero carbon emission by 2060, or even earlier. It is a remarkably ambitious climate commitment, particularly from a populist leader from the Global South where economic development often takes precedence over climate mitigation. The pledge is all the more striking given that, just before Prabowo’s speech, U.S. President Donald Trump dismissed the climate crisis as mere fantasy. Both men are populist leaders, yet their positions on the issue of climate crisis could not be more sharply opposed.

Strikingly, it is no longer the leader of the Global North who offers the more reasonable view. After hearing both leaders’ speeches, some observers might reasonably conclude that climate leadership today is more likely to come from Jakarta than from Washington.

 What explains this unexpected contrast?

 

Let us begin by considering Indonesia’s position as a rising middle-power seeking greater legitimacy on the global stage. For Jakarta, demonstrating attentiveness to key international concerns is a way of reinforcing its claim to a more prominent place among nations. The decision to include a climate commitment in its UN address reflects not only the global salience of the issue, but also an understanding that climate leadership can advance Indonesia’s broader diplomatic aspirations. 

 

More importantly, Jakarta must reassure the international community that, despite the domestic struggles surrounding climate policy, its long-term commitment remains intact. Indonesia’s declared net-zero ambition stands in tension with persistent gaps, particularly in the energy sector. The most telling example is the failure to meet its initial pledge of raising the share of renewable energy to 23 percent by 2025, a target that has since been revised.

 

These domestic shortcomings make it all the more necessary for Jakarta to project a firm outward commitment, so as not to be perceived as faltering and thereby risk its international standing. In today’s geopolitical context, climate pledges are more than environmental targets. They function as signals of credibility and responsibility in the world stage.

 

For developing countries like Indonesia, climate pledges are closely linked to the prospect of attracting investment. A 2022 estimate by Indonesia’s Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) projected that Indonesia would require around USD 1 trillion in renewable energy investment to achieve its 2060 net-zero target. An expert from the Institute for Essential Services Reforms (IESR) suggested that this financial requirement translates into climate-aligned financing on the order of USD 30 to 40 billion annually over the next three decades.

 

For Jakarta, projecting firm commitment abroad is thus not only about maintaining credibility, but also about fostering the trust and partnership necessary to mobilize financial support required for its domestic decarbonization. 

 

While Jakarta remains attentive to its reputation and image on the global stage, Washington has largely cast both aside under the second Trump administration. Recent policies—most notably America’s recent turn toward tariffs and economic nationalism—illustrate how little priority the Trump administration places on sustaining America’s international standing. Rather than addressing a global audience, Trump’s speech appeared aimed primarily at the U.S. domestic public, where climate change has become a central fault line in the country’s political and affective polarization.

 

Research by political scientists Schertzer and Woods shows that Trump’s “America First” rhetoric is closely tied to a focus on reviving domestic energy production, which he frames as essential to securing America’s interests, security, and prosperity. This stands in marked contrast to the approach of Democratic leaders whose policies emphasize combating the climate crisis and accelerating a transition away from mining and other extractive industries. Republicans have generally taken a more sceptical stance on climate change, while Democrats have adopted a more activist approach. A 2022 Pew Research Center poll found that 78 percent of Democrats viewed climate change as a threat to the country’s well-being, compared with only 23 percent of Republicans. In this context, President Trump’s controversial remarks are best understood as signalling to his Republican base and reinforcing partisan ties. Washington is, in effect, consumed by its own domestic battles between polarized camps, and Trump’s speech has a domestic audience despite its global occasion.

 

While Washington remains preoccupied with its domestic battles, Jakarta has offered a much-needed glimpse of hope. By placing climate commitments at the center of its international messaging, Indonesia signals that emerging powers can step into roles once expected of traditional leaders. Jakarta’s more rational and globally aligned stance on the climate crisis also offers a measure of hope for activists and policymakers alike.

 

In an era when geopolitical power centers are shifting, it is becoming clear that reasoned leadership need not come only from the traditional metropoles of the Global North. Emerging powers of the Global South, Indonesia among them, are increasingly capable of articulating visions that resonate with global norms and expectations.

 

Oral History of Yudhoyono's Career

 There is a new book about former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) written and edited by a group of Japanese and Indonesian scholar; Takashi Shiraishi, Jun Honna, Wahyu Prasetyawan, and Nobuhiro Aizawa. The title of the book is Standing Firm for Indonesia's Democracy published by World Scientific. I think the book is marvellous, and provides very important raw material for future historians and social scientists studying Indonesian presidency. I am honored to be invited by CSIS to review the book for their journal, The Indonesian Quarterly. You can read my review below.

Standing Firm for Indonesia's Democracy: An Oral History of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Few individuals have had a front-row seat to Indonesian history like Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. With a career spanning crucial periods under both the authoritarian New Order and the democratic Reformasi era, Yudhoyono found himself in strategic positions to lead various military and civilian organizations, as well as the country itself. Notably, he was the first directly elected president of democratic Indonesia, governing from 2004 to 2014.

This book is an oral history project documenting Yudhoyono’s career, not only as the president of Indonesia but also as a military officer, general, minister, and party politician before he assumed the presidency. It is the first of its kind in Indonesia, brought to fruition by a dedicated team of Indonesia specialists over seven years, from 2016 to 2023. The result is a remarkably rich and informed manuscript capturing Yudhoyono up close and personal. Chapters are ordered chronologically, following the trajectory of Yudhoyono’s career.

Chapters one to three cover Yudhoyono's time as an active military officer prior to Indonesia’s democratic transition in 1999. Chapters four and five detail his service as a minister under President Abdurrahman Wahid and President Megawati Sukarnoputri, respectively. Chapter six discusses Yudhoyono's entry into electoral politics, the establishment of Partai Demokrat, and his run for the presidency. Chapters seven and eight provide his views on his first and second presidencies. Finally, chapters nine to eleven explore Yudhoyono’s take on several important policy issues, including decentralization, regional geopolitics, and democratic leadership.

For keen observers of Indonesian politics, the book offers important insights into themes such as Yudhoyono’s status as the son-in-law of General Sarwo Edhie Wibowo and its impact on his career and relationship with President Soeharto. Another intriguing question is Yudhoyono’s position on the alleged factional rift within the Indonesian military between “ABRI Merah Putih” and “ABRI Hijau” during the late New Order. On both counts, Yudhoyono appears judicious in his responses, leaving little room for controversial speculation.

Yudhoyono also addresses his relationships with former superiors, Presidents Wahid and Megawati, which have seen both high and low points. He was forced to resign from his role as Coordinating Minister of Defense and Security by Wahid for refusing to dissolve the parliament, and fell out of favor with Megawati after deciding to run for the presidency in 2004. In both events, Yudhoyono provided contextual explanation leading to the decisions he made.

Yudhoyono’s rise to the presidency is a fascinating theme in Indonesia’s political history. He founded Partai Demokrat from scratch and quickly led it to political dominance. In the book, Yudhoyono attributes his success to his acute attention to popular surveys, which informed him of his popularity. This information paired with the institutional shift to one man one vote system bolstered his confidence to run for office.

Readers interested in Indonesia’s political history or conducting research on it will find this book invaluable. Unlike other monographs in political science or history, this book does not present a specific argument but serves as raw interview material, offering a wealth of data and important contextual explanations from Yudhoyono himself.

There are at least two reasons why the raw materials in this book are invaluable. First, the wealth of data it provides is simply unmatched. The editors pose many important and sensitive questions, and Yudhoyono offers relevant answers, often with crucial contextual explanations of why certain episodes in his career unfolded as they did.

Second, producing such a scholarly work requires enormous effort, particularly in gaining access to presidents or ex-presidents, which is notoriously difficult. Researchers must be highly trusted to secure the time and cooperation of such high-profile individuals. The editors of this book, being prominent Indonesianists with significant connections in presidential circles, managed to achieve this. Without their expertise and connections, producing a book of this nature would be nearly impossible.

Thus, the editors have rendered a great service to the community of scholars studying Indonesia. This book will be especially important for those focusing on presidential studies in the country. Admittedly, the study of presidents and presidentialism in Indonesia has not yet attained the popularity it enjoys in other established democracies, such as the United States. However, this book could serve as a crucial starting point for many significant future studies.

                                                   

PSI’s Electoral Gambit: Will It Pay Dividends?

The Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI, Indonesia’s Solidarity Party) has captured the nation’s attention with its maneuver electing Kaesang Pangarep, the youngest son of president Joko Widodo or Jokowi, as its party leader. Kaesang’s appointment is nothing short of phenomenal, considering that he has only been a party member for less than a week and has no prior history of involvement with the party.

More importantly, it also marks a significant step in the party’s ongoing effort to demonstrate its unwavering loyalty to President Joko Widodo. Previously, PSI has introduced the concept of “Jokowisme”, which posits that Jokowi’s style of governing constitutes a coherent philosophy. The party has also declared its commitment to heed any directives from the executive branch.

 

What accounts for PSI’s abrupt change in direction, transitioning from a party predominantly driven by a progressive, liberal democratic agenda to one tethering its destiny to a political figure recently associated with Indonesia’s democratic setbacks? What factors are at play in their strategic calculus, and what could lie ahead for PSI in the future?

The Electoral Dilemma

 

PSI abrupt change in direction is perplexing given the potential negative repercussions they carry. For one, the country’s executive branch has faced criticism for contributing to Indonesia’s democratic setback with its several undemocratic policy positions. Secondly, the president has also left the impression that he may lean towards supporting Prabowo Subianto, his defense minister with a history of human rights allegations, in the upcoming presidential election. Considering PSI’s progressive reputation, it appears imprudent to align itself with these two political figures.

 

Indeed, PSI has consequently suffered criticism from various quarters including internally from party cadres. Among the criticisms levelled against the party are allegations of supporting political dynasty and backing a presidential contender with a problematic political history. These criticisms could potentially undermine PSI’s already limited voter base. Signs of these erosion have become evident with the resignation of several influential party cadres such as Guntur Romli. 

 

Upon closer inspection, however, all these perplexing political maneuvers may actually constitute a calculated electoral gambit to respond to a certain electoral dilemma. PSI sacrifices some up front while hoping for considerable future gain. 

 

To begin with, understanding PSI’s electoral strategy necessitates recognizing the party’s unfortunate predicaments, its current challenge, as well as the electoral dilemma the party is grappling with. Like other small, newly-formed parties, PSI faces what seems like unsurmountable challenge: the requirement to pass the 4% electoral threshold in order to secure seats for their legislative candidates in the national parliament. For the record, in the previous 2019 legislative election, PSI only managed to garner a negligible 1.89% or approximately 2.6 million of the national votes.

 

PSI’s poor performance stems from two unfortunate predicaments, structural and non-structural in nature. First, the party lacks a charismatic figure that could attract voters in a populist fashion, namely through direct connection between the elites and the masses. Secondly, PSI’s ideological agenda, centered around the principles of liberal democracy, finds itself resting on an exceedingly narrow support base within Indonesia. Liberal democrats have always been a minuscule minority in Indonesian politics.

 

In formulating a strategy to cope with this challenge, PSI encounters a dilemma revolving around choosing two equally unfavorable alternatives. First, PSI could make efforts to expand beyond their initial electoral base, the predominantly urban liberal democrats, to attract new supporters presumably from Jokowi’s voters. Pursuing this course, however, might entail compromising their ideological agenda and might result in losing the former without necessarily gaining many of the latter. 

 

The second alternative involves sticking to their liberal democratic platform while hoping for more favorable outcome in the 2024 election. This stance does not appear promising as repeated survey results consistently indicate that supports for PSI remains below the 2% mark. 

 

As immediate changes to the demographic and ideological composition of the country are beyond reach, PSI consequently has focused on remedying their first predicament: identifying a charismatic figure to tie their electoral prospects with. A figure like Joko Widodo is an ideal candidate due to the populist appeal that the president’s hold over the masses. To date, Jokowi’s approval rating is consistently above 75%. 

 

PSI is thus banking on the possibility of benefitting from a coattail effect, if any, by endorsing the president and creating a virtually interchangeable image between the party and the president. 

 

 

Will the Electoral Gambit Yield Dividend? 

 

PSI is not the first party with similar electoral problems of narrow voter base and the need to reach out beyond its initial ideological corner. The history of electoral socialism in the early 20th century Europe provides us with a pertinent lesson that social democratic parties increased their vote shares once they abandoned their revolutionary ideals and reached out beyond its working-class base. 

 

PSI’s move to the center, namely following suit other parties in Indonesian political arena that promote political figure instead of programs, thus appears promising. One could say that PSI is maturing to become a political realist. The party relinquishes its transformative agenda, and fully embraces the pragmatic nature of Indonesian politics. 

 

As a consequence of this strategic pivot, the party will receive more exposure beyond its initial urban, highly educated, secular-nationalist niche. It will broaden its appeal to encompass those voters who identify themselves with Joko Widodo and his family on a national scale. It is plausible that PSI will be better known as a Kaesang’s party instead of a party driven by a transformative mission.

 

In the long run, however, PSI will also be indistinguishable from other parties which relies on charismatic figures. More importantly, its fate will be tied with the currency of Joko Widodo’s reputation. This reliance to Jokowi’s standing creates a possibility where PSI’s votes could experience a gradual decline in the future. 

 

Personal popularity, much like any other political commodity, comes with an expiration date. The example of president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who was once highly popular, serves as a reminder that even the most esteemed figures can witness a decline in their popularity over time. His Democratic Party, once at the pinnacle of political influence, has gradually descended to a more modest position in Indonesia’s political landscape. 

PSI ought to be mindful, recognizing that their short-term tactical maneuver may run counter to their long-term strategic objective: namely to establish a stable presence in Indonesia's political arena.

The Jakarta Post, 2023/10/14

Not So Common, Apparently

As has been a tradition in understanding politicians and their political behavior in Indonesia, one typically scrutinizes their formative period as a person: where they were born, grew up, and finally maturing as a politicians. This biographical approach has a long pedigree; see one writing about general Soeharto here, and even one writing about our current president Joko Widodo here. 

A trope in this approach is how the politician comes from humble background and thus explains their (alleged) quest to elevate the fate of the marginalized: economically, socially, politically. "I am part of the 'rakyat' or commoners." That is more or less the message the politicians broadcast. Whether that is genuinely the case, or a mere fronting, is for you to judge yourself (should you have the privilege to know the politicians in person).

I myself am curious to see where Jokowi used to hang out, especially where his favorite culinary joints are. Information from the internet tells us that during his days in Solo one of his favorite places is soto Triwindu, a meat or chicken soup named after the traditional market where the food stall located.

 

 I consider myself a big fan of soto, not yet a knowledgable afficionado but already a sucker for soto session anytime anywhere, and can confirm that soto Triwindu is indeed delicious, off the chart for that type of soto. But also, here is an important information, a rather fancy soto place. At least to my initial impression.

If soto is commoners' food, then soto Triwindu is among the royals. Certainly not the kind of kaki lima place I go every morning. Soto Triwindu sets itself aside from others not because it is being overtly expensive. It is still affordable to Jakarta middle class' purchasing power. Rather, it is special owing to its presentation. It is more a restaurant than a street food stall. The fried tempehs, beef tripe (babat), and other side dishes to compliment the soto are put inside a glass drawer of a rather fancy piece of furniture, to mention one of its unique presentation.

Now, lets assume this is indeed Jokowi's favorite soto place and there is an extent to which it describes what kind of person he is. Is he a commoners like us? Yes and no. Our president indeed is a commoner. Much more so seen from the capital of Jakarta where the middle class frequent fancy ethnic restaurants and Western food franchises. But among the commoners, Jokowi occupies a place in its upper echelon. He appears cultured, has a taste, and more importantly could afford his taste. People tend to forget that when he commenced his journey in electoral politics, he has already been a self-made man (subnational scale nothwitstanding) namely a successful furniture businessman exporting his products worldwide.